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INTRODUCTION
We are living in a mass-surveillance society. Digital cameras
with zoom and night-vision capacity proliferate in our nation's
cities.' Fusion centers, at last count numbering over seventy
around the country, are sucking up gigabytes of information about
our transactions.2 Transponders in our cars and Global
Positioning System (GPS) devices in our phones allow our travels
to be tracked twenty-four hours a day.3 Drones developed for
wartime, equipped with high-powered magnification devices, are
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I would
like to thank Wayne Logan for his comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.
I See, e.g., Paul Joseph Watson, New Street Lights to Have "Homeland Security"
Applications, INFOWARS.COM (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.infowars.com/new-street-
lights-to-have-homeland-security-applications; Local Surveillance to Plug into
Homeland Security Camera System, INFOWARS.COM (Sept. 24, 2008),
http://www.infowars.com/local-surveillance-to-plug-into-homeland-security-camera-
system; Fran Spielman, Feds Give City $48 Million in Anti-terrorism Funds, CHI. SUN-
TIMEs, Dec. 4, 2004, at 10.
2 See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., Fusion Center Locations and Contact
Information, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information (last
visited Jan. 6, 2013) (listing 77 fusion center locations).
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION: APPLICATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS (2005); Justin Elliot, How Easy Is It for the Police to Get
GPS Data from Your Phone?, TPM MUCKRAKER (Dec. 9, 2009, 2:13 PM),
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/12/cell-phonesurveillance unpacki
ng-the_1egalissues.php.
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flying over our urban areas every hour of the day.4 Although these
techniques are now pervasive, and are often invasive, their
defining characteristic is their panvasiveness-the fact that they
affect so many people, most of them innocent of any wrongdoing.
Panvasive surveillance could be deemed a type of search. But
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable "searches" has pretty much neutered
the Constitution's ability to regulate the ways modern government
keeps tabs on its citizens. According to the Court, one generally
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy-and thus can
have no constitutionally protected interest-in activities that take
place in public spaces or in transactions that involve third
parties.5 We assume the risk that these everyday activities will be
viewed by or disclosed to the government, and thus the
government needs no justification when it decides to monitor
them. The Court's recent decision in United States v. JoneS6 -
which held that placing a tracking device on a car infringes a
property interest protected by the Fourth Amendment 7-and the
concurring opinions in that case-which evidenced a willingness
to recognize a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in travels over
a long period of time 8-signal that the Court may be rethinking its
views on this score. But as the law stands right now, panvasive
investigative techniques are immune from Fourth Amendment
regulation.
4 Is the NYPD Experimenting with Drones over the City? Evidence Points to Yes,
CBS NEW YORK (Jan. 23, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/01/23/is-
the-nypd-experimenting-with-drones-over-the-city-evidence-points-to-yes; Katie Baker,
CNN: 'Houston Police Use Drone Planes,' THE RAW STORY (Nov. 25, 2007),
http://rawstory.com/news/2007/CNN-Houston-policeiuse -drone-planes 1124.html.
5 See Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological
Age?, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 11, 12-19 (Jeffrey
Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011). Some scholars have argued that the First
Amendment can fill the gaps left by the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but
no court has been willing to take this approach. See Daniel J. Solove, The First
Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (2007); see also Marc
Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First
Amendment Should Be More Like that of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (2010).
6 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
7 Id. at 949.
8 See id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
[VOL. 82:2308
2013] PANVASIVE SEARCHES 309
William Rehnquist had a lot to do with that. In the opinions
addressing search and seizure issues that he wrote or joined, he
endorsed a view of the Fourth Amendment that favored the
concrete over the invisible. To him, a confrontation with a police
officer, no matter how intimidating, was not a seizure unless it
involved some type of physical force.9 More relevant to the current
discussion, the Fourth Amendment opinions he wrote or joined
stand for the proposition that a police action that avoids physical
invasion of "persons, houses, papers, and effects"' 0 is not a search,
no matter how aggressive police were in looking for evidence of
crime."
Yet Rehnquist was not inattentive to the less tangible
interests that the Fourth Amendment might be said to protect. In
particular, panvasive police surveillance, even if aimed solely at
activities openly carried out in public, was something that
concerned him. Support for that perhaps surprising conclusion
comes not from his Fourth Amendment opinions, which did not
give him an occasion to address the issue directly, but from a law
review article he wrote shortly after he joined the Court, entitled
Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and
9 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002) (holding, in an
opinion joined by Rehnquist, that police confrontation of a passenger on a bus was not
a seizure); Florida v. Rodriguez, 460 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1984) (per curiam) (holding, in an
opinion joined by Rehnquist, that a police request to follow officer to another location
was consensual); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 508, 518 (1983) (holding, with
Rehnquist dissenting, that Royer was seized when agents held his ticket and
identification); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (in which
Rehnquist was one of only two Justices concluding that Mendenhall was not seized);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218-19, 223-25 (1979) (holding, with Rehnquist as
one of two dissenters, that Dunaway was not seized when he was taken from his home
to the stationhouse for questioning).
1o U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
n1 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41-46 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing, with Rehnquist in dissent, that use of a thermal imager to detect
heat differentials inside a home is a search); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52
(1989) (holding, in an opinion joined by Rehnquist, that flying 400 yards over a
backyard is not a search); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding, in
an opinion joined by Rehnquist, that searching through garbage is not a search); Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984) (holding, in an opinion joined by
Rehnquist, that search of open fields is not a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 707 (1983) (stating, in dictum joined by Rehnquist, that a dog sniff of luggage is
not a search). Cf. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000) (holding, in an
opinion written by Rehnquist, that physically manipulating luggage to feel the contents
is a search).
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Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way,
Baby.12 Despite the subtitle's insinuation that the privacy
envelope might have been pushed too far, this article, appearing
in 1974 in the University of Kansas Law Review, expounds on
principles that might be particularly pertinent in thinking about
whether and how modern police investigative techniques ought to
be regulated.
Stated succinctly, the principles that one can glean from
Rehnquist's article are three in number: (1) the Fourth
Amendment protects "freedom from unauthorized oversight or
observation;" (2) government infringement of this freedom
requires a "particularized law enforcement interest;" and (3) the
latter requirement is strongest when the government seeks items
a person "has chosen to keep private and away from prying eyes,"
but does not disappear simply because the activities or items
observed are in public.' 3 After describing some of the more
provocative general points Rehnquist makes in his University of
Kansas Law Review article, this Essay explains how these three
specific principles emerge from its pages. The Essay then
speculates how Rehnquist might have applied the principles to
panvasive investigative methods. It concludes that the Fourth
Amendment analysis Rehnquist appears to endorse in his article,
contrary to the Court's current approach, might place some non-
trivial limitations on many of the global investigative methods
modern police forces use today.
I. PRIVACY, YOU'VE COME A LONG WAY, BABY: SOME GENERAL
THEMES
Rehnquist's article, a written version of two lectures
delivered at the University of Kansas School of Law on September
26th and 27th, 1974, is fascinating for a number of reasons. First,
of course, it is authored by a man who would be instrumental in
defining the scope of constitutional privacy for the next quarter
12 William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and
Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1 (1974).
13 See infra notes 37-69 and accompanying text (discussing Rehnquist's three
principles).
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PANVASIVE SEARCHES
century. 14 Second, somewhat surprisingly in light of Rehnquist's
antipathy toward expansive Fourth Amendment protections, the
article is very respectful of privacy. Rehnquist states that privacy
is a "concept going to the roots of our citizens' independence,
dignity, and integrity."15 While the overall tone of the article is
that privacy interests should generally not trump legitimate law
enforcement goals, he emphasizes that "no thinking person" would
consider privacy "a negative value."1 6
Third, while the article is on the whole cautious in its
conclusions, some of its ruminations about the interaction of
privacy and law enforcement verge on the controversial, or at least
are unexpectedly provocative for a new Justice on the Court. A
central theme of the article is the parallel it draws between
Justice Louis Brandeis's right to be let alone,' 7 often seen as the
progenitor of the Supreme Court's privacy-oriented approach to
the Fourth Amendment,18 and the Court's anti-regulatory line of
cases originating with Lochner v. New York in 1905.19 Rehnquist
recognized that Lochner's aggressive interpretation of the freedom
of contract-an approach that allowed the Court to strike down
democratically enacted wage and hour statutes-was no longer
the law. 20 But, he asserted that the now-defunct, Lochner-type
cases were "sisters under the skin"21 with decisions like Griswold
v. Connecticut,2 2 which nullified, on privacy grounds, a law
14 Craig M. Bradley, The Fourth Amendment: Be Reasonable, in THE REHNQUIST
LEGACY 104, 104 (Craig Bradley ed., 2006) (stating that, in the Fourth Amendment
context, "[m]ore often than not, [Rehnquist] has convinced a majority of his colleagues
to go along with his conservative views and, even in dissent, invariably advances
cogent and well-reasoned arguments").
15 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 1.
16 Id. at 2.
17 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Fourth Amendment "conferred, as against the government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men").
I See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a "Search" Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 51 (2006) ("Following Brandeis' lead, many others
through the decades have voiced similar arguments that the Fourth Amendment must
be construed to afford protections against the dramatic increase in the ability of the
government to intrude based on advances in technology.").
19 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2o Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 6.
21 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2013] 311
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restricting the use of birth control, and Roe v. Wade,23 which
limited legislatures' ability to restrict abortion. Thus, Rehnquist
apparently did not entirely subscribe to the economic-freedom-
may-be-restricted-but-personal-freedom-may-not-be dichotomy on
which the Court itself has relied in distinguishing the two lines of
cases.24 Rather, he thought they were closely related because both
grapple with the extend to which the government can control
individuals' decisions about their lives.
That reluctance to confine Griswold and its progeny to the
most intimate liberty interests led him to an astonishing proposal
for a conservative Justice: Decriminalization. Privacy might best
be protected not by placing limitations on police ability to enforce
the law, Rehnquist suggested, but by eliminating, as both
Griswold and Lochner did, certain types of laws. Rehnquist
started this train of thought by noting that, consistent with
procedural-justice research that would not see the light of day
until a decade later,25 restrictions on law enforcement in the name
of privacy not only handcuff police but might also "lessen[] the
pressure to obey the law" by people who are normally law-
abiding-whether they obey the law because of a sense of moral
duty or because they fear being caught for their transgressions. 2 6
What is the point of following the law, Rehnquist thought people
might complain, if the government does not enforce it?
He then tied this observation to his affinity for the civil
libertarian aspects of Lochner. Rather than making law
enforcement difficult in order to protect privacy, he reasoned, a
better way of avoiding "the corroding effect of undermining both
respect for the law and willingness to obey the law" might be to
eliminate some of the more intrusive criminal statutes.27 Although
his level of enthusiasm for this radical move is difficult to assess,
he stated that "it is not at all impossible" that prostitution,
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24 The distinction was made most explicitly in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 ("We do
not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that
touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however,
operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role
in one aspect of that relation.").
25 See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (1990).
26 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 19.
27 Id. at 20.
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pimping, and even marijuana-possession laws could join in
purgatory the provisions struck down in Griswold and Roe!28 To be
clear, he believed that decriminalization is the province of
legislatures, not courts. But, presaging a debate that is heating up
today,29 he labeled as "compelling" the argument that "it is
preferable to repeal a law that makes a particular act criminally
punishable rather than to keep the law on the books but make it
very difficult to enforce against those who transgress it."30
Another surprising set of claims Rehnquist made in Privacy,
You've Come a Long Way, Baby-at least for those who think of
him as a dyed-in-the-wool Crime Control Crusader-presage
modern-day debates about the inevitable tension between privacy
on the one hand and the state's increasing demand for personal
information necessary to carry out its taxation and regulatory
objectives on the other.3' As Rehnquist put it, "[T]he stark fact of
the matter is that one need in no way be under suspicion of having
violated a law or breached a regulation in order for the
government to begin to acquire information about him."3 2 He then
stated that while a person could, in theory, avoid revelation of
private details by declining government largesse and thus avoid
28 Id.
29 Compare Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment:
Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 36 (2011)
(arguing that police misuse of arrests for minor crimes should be fought by increasing
Fourth Amendment protection in such situations), with Christopher Slobogin, Why
Crime Severity Analysis is Not Reasonable, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1, 5-7 (2012),
http://www.uiowa.edul-ilrbulletin/ILRB_97_Slobogin.pdf (arguing that abuses of
discretion in minor cases should be addressed through eliminating vagueness-tainted
minor crimes, not changing Fourth Amendment justification standards). In Florence v.
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012), the Court refused to differentiate
between serious and minor offenses in the context of strip searches prior to detention in
jail, on the ground that even people arrested for disorderly conduct, trespass, and
shoplifting could smuggle in contraband and weapons, see id. at 1523. The four-
member dissent found this danger to be minimal when weighed against the invasion
and argued that strip searches should require reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1525
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Another solution, per Rehnquist, would be to decriminalize
disorderly conduct and other minor offenses, or at least foreclose custodial arrests of
those who commit such offenses. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
30 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 21.
31 See, e.g., William Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1019 (1995) (arguing that a Fourth Amendment based on
privacy is in significant tension with the state's need to gather information relevant to
the regulatory state).
32 Id. at 15.
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government regulatory inquiries, "in the real world this may not
be a very meaningful option."33
The latter observation is particularly interesting in light of
the Court's statement two years later in United States v. Miller34
(a decision Rehnquist joined) that people "voluntarily" convey
their financial information to banks.35 His 1974 lecture, read in
context, is not necessarily inconsistent with that decision.36 But
his language at least indicates a Justice aware of the tradeoffs.
II. IS AN EXPANDED RIGHT OF PRIVACY CONSISTENT WITH FAIR
AND EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT?: THREE PRINCIPLES
Much of the rest of Rehnquist's 1974 article wrestles with the
privacy implications of variations on one particular scenario:
Government recording and dissemination of convictions, arrests,
and sub-arrest "detentions." It was in the course of discussing this
topic that Rehnquist developed the three principles described
earlier.
Rehnquist began by stating what he regarded as a truism:
Convictions and arrests are public events and thus cannot be
"private."37 Borrowing from Webster's Dictionary, he defined the
latter term-which he believed to be "largely" coextensive with the
protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment-as 'the quality or
state of being apart from the company or observation of others' or
'freedom from unauthorized oversight or observation,"' thus
establishing what I am calling his first principle of the Fourth
Amendment.38 Using this definition of privacy, Rehnquist quickly
3 Id. at 16.
3 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
5 Id. at 442.
36 Immediately after the quoted statement Rehnquist seemed to express a
reluctance to carry the idea to its logical conclusion by stating:
[Ihf we find significant policy obstacles to dispensing with the requirement
that individuals who seek benefits from the government furnish information
to show that they are entitled to the benefits, it may well be that some of the
same policy arguments militate against the incautious imposition of
additional restrictions on governmental information gathering in the area of
criminal law enforcement.
Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 18-19.
37 Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 Id. at 4 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804
(1961)).
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concluded that legitimate convictions and arrests (as
distinguished from sub-arrest detentions) are "public" facts, and
that any individual interest in expunging them is generally
overridden by government informational needs.39
Furthermore, Rehnquist was loath to put significant
limitations on dissemination of conviction and arrest data. He saw
no reason to prevent such records from being revealed to other law
enforcement agencies. 40 Nor did he appear to have a problem with
providing conviction or arrest records to potential employers.
While he could see "respectable arguments" for withholding arrest
data from the latter group given the possibility of inaccuracy and
unfair prejudice, he suggested that "an educational campaign"
would be a preferable way of handling any bias problem.41 With
respect to presumably more reliable conviction records, not even
disclosure to the public at large appeared to give him pause.
Noting that recent trends had been "to open up governmental
activities to public inspection and to permit public access to many
kinds of government records that were formerly thought to be
confidential," he stated that "it would take a far stronger claim of
privacy than any I have heard made to require the opposite result
in the case of criminal conviction."42
Fifteen years later Rehnquist would join an opinion
upholding denial of a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
request for a government rap sheet.43 But that decision was based
on the rationale that the FOIA is meant to facilitate press and
citizen access to "what the Government is up to," not to records
documenting individuals' personal information.44  More
representative of Rehnquist's approach to privacy claims with
respect to dissemination of criminal records are the holdings in
Paul v. DaviS4 5 and Smith v. Doe.4 6 In Davis, written by Rehnquist
two years after the Kansas speech, the Court held that public
39 Id. at 8.9 (records of conviction); id. at10 (arrest records).
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id. at 12.
42 Id.
43 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
762-63 (1989).
44 Id. at 780 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
46 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
2013] 315
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distribution of flyers containing a picture of Davis and erroneously
depicting him as an "active shoplifter" did not deprive him of
"liberty" or "property," regardless of any harm they may have done
to his reputation. 47 Rehnquist also characterized as "far afield"
Davis's argument that the distribution of the flyers impinged "his
freedom of action in a sphere contended to be 'private;"' Rehnquist
simply pointed to the fact that the arrest upon which the flyer was
based was an "official act."48 In Smith, Rehnquist joined an
opinion that rejected an ex post facto claim against a sex-offender
notification, in the course of which the Court stated that
"[a]lthough the public availability of the information may have a
lasting and painful impact on the convicted sex offender, these
consequences flow not from the Act's registration and
dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a
matter of public record."49
Thus, Rehnquist was not sympathetic to privacy challenges
involving the disclosure, much less the recording, of convictions
and arrests. But he was more reluctant to sanction lesser
information-gathering endeavors, including government
documentation of sub-arrest detentions. In the course of
explaining why, he recognized that even activities that take place
in public should often be immune from government observation,
particularly when, to use the term coined earlier, they are
panvasive.
Rehnquist began his analysis by asking the reader to imagine
that police officials station a car at the entrance of a popular bar's
parking lot every evening for two hours, solely for the purpose of
taking down license numbers that are subsequently matched with
names through motor vehicle records.50 He then stated:
If we assume that the bar has the necessary liquor license to
sell drinks, that nothing more is known about the individuals
patronizing the bar than that they happen to drive into its
47 Davis, 424 U.S. at 695, 712 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 Id. at 713.
4 Smith, 538 U.S. at 101. Rehnquist also joined the majority opinion in Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), which held that "neither the immediate nor the threatened
impact" of revealing patients' identities to treatment personnel constituted "an
invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 603-04.
5o Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 9.
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parking lot at this hour, and that there are no other special
circumstances present, I would guess that the great majority
of people who might have the question posed to them would
say that this is not a proper police function. 51
Rehnquist apparently placed himself within this
hypothesized majority. While he noted that, given the fact that
other citizens could easily observe the activity, driving into a bar
parking lot could not be considered private "in any normal sense of
the word, there would be an uneasiness, and I think a justified
uneasiness, if those who patronized the bar felt that their names
were being taken down and filed for future reference" by the
government.52 He went on to say that "most of us would feel
that. . . a dossier on every citizen ought not to be compiled even if
manpower were available to do it."53
Coming from Rehnquist, these comments are remarkable,
because they are contrary to the dogma, alluded to earlier, that
the Court began developing even before he joined the Court:
Outside the home, one cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in activity that occurs in full view of third parties. This
idea was espoused even in the landmark and supposedly liberal
case of Katz v. United States,54 which stated in 1967, several years
before Rehnquist joined that Court, that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."55 It was repeated
in several later cases involving tracking on public thoroughfares,56
flyovers of curtilage,5 7 and (in cases like Miller) accessing financial
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 10.
5 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
55 Id. at 351.
56 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) ("When [the defendant]
traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look
the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of
whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from
public roads onto private property.").
57 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) ("Any member of the public
flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers
observed. . . . [Therefore] we readily conclude that respondent's expectation that his
garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation
that society is prepared to honor.").
2013] 317
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and phone information from the companies that maintained it58-
all of which Rehnquist joined.
To be sure, in his University of Kansas Law Review article
Rehnquist was careful to avoid saying that his bar hypothetical
implicated the Fourth Amendment. Rather he distinguished "our
general aversion to governmental surveillance of even our most
public acts" from "the 'core' concerns of the [F]ourth [A]mendment
privacy."59 The important point, however, is that whatever one
calls the claim attributable to the bar patrons, Rehnquist thought
it a viable one. This type of public surveillance was not, to
Rehnquist, a proper government function. Furthermore, even
though he stated that activities in a public place cannot be called
private in a 'dictionary' sense, he also recognized that people
who engage in them can have a "claim to privacy" in a more
general sense.60 Indeed, as a technical matter, the dictionary
definition he quoted speaks of "unauthorized oversight or
observation."61 One can thus make the case that, even in
Rehnquist's own terms, privacy is infringed when government
acquires information it is not authorized to acquire.
The inevitable next question concerns when government
information gathering is authorized. In developing what might be
termed his second principle, Rehnquist suggested that there must
be a "particularized law enforcement interest" to justify an
infringement of "privacy."62 But by this he did not necessarily
mean "individualized suspicion," as that term has been used in
many Supreme Court cases, to refer to suspicion about a
particular individual.63 Rather, he was quite willing to
countenance a more general, programmatic government rationale.
58 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) ("When he used his phone,
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so
doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the
numbers he dialed."); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) ("The depositor
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed
by that person to the Government.").
59 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 14.
60 Id. at 13.
61 Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 Id. at 11.
63 Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976) (contrasting
stops at a checkpoint with stops of individuals and stating that, although "some
318 [VOL. 82:2
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For instance, building on the bar scenario he asserted that if,
on two successive evenings, a patron of the bar had been killed
during the evening hours in question "a significantly different
picture would be presented."64 Surveillance of the many innocent
people observed during the stakeout would now be permissible, he
stated, since the government has a legitimate interest "in
developing whatever information might be available about each
patron of the bar during the time in question on subsequent
nights."65 Similarly, Rehnquist wrote, photographing spectators at
a series of rallies held by a presidential candidate, after police
come to suspect that someone might be stalking the candidate,
could be justified "given the extraordinary gravity and
seriousness" of the situation.66 Both scenarios require invading
the public anonymity of dozens or hundreds of people. But because
they involve attempting to detect, apprehend, or preempt a killer,
neither gave Rehnquist pause.
This willingness to permit "pan-investigations" of public
activities in the absence of individualized suspicion, but only if
some type of legitimate justification exists, suggests a third
principle behind Rehnquist's comments. In other work, I have
called it the "proportionality principle," the idea that the
justification for a government-investigative action ought to be
proportionate to its intrusiveness. 67 As Rehnquist put it, "The very
strong core-area interest of the individual in not having private
papers in his home searched and seized by the government may be
overridden because of what is considered the even stronger
societal interest in permitting police, upon a proper showing, to
conduct a search in order to apprehend and convict a criminal.68
At the same time, he stated, "[T]he much lesser individual interest
in not having public activities observed and recorded may prevail
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search
or seizure[,] . . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such
suspicion.").
64 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 11.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 13.
67 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEw GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 21 (2007); see also Christopher Slobogin,
The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 68-75 (1991).
68 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 14.
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in the absence of any governmental justification for the
surveillance."69 Thus, Rehnquist seemed to think that even
minimal governmental intrusions required some, albeit minimal,
justification.
III. IMPLICATIONS
To those familiar with the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the previous sentence rings hollow. In the public-
surveillance and institutional-third-party cases noted above,
Rehnquist joined or wrote decisions that permitted, in the absence
of any justification whatsoever, government observation of or
access to all sorts of activities and transactions, not only "public"
ones but also many that most people would dub "private."70
Rehnquist's University of Kansas Law Review article might be
written off as merely the product of a new Justice waxing
philosophical about sub-constitutional matters that he knows will
have no impact on the Court's docket.
In none of the Supreme Court cases noted to this point,
however, was the police action panvasive in nature. Rather, all of
them involved an investigation of one individual for whom the
government had developed at least some degree of suspicion. For
instance, in Miller government agents had zeroed in on Miller as
the operator of an illegal distillery at the time they requisitioned
his bank records.7' In Smith v. Maryland,72 which held that phone
records maintained by the phone company are not protected by
the Fourth Amendment, the police already had reason to suspect
that Smith was the perpetrator of a robbery before they obtained
phone-company logs describing his phone calls.7 3 In each of the
flyover cases, government agents or informants had fingered the
69 Id.
70 For instance, while the Court has held that information given to a bank is not
private for Fourth Amendment purposes, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-42
(1976), most citizens would probably conclude otherwise. See Christopher Slobogin &
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted
by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738-39 (1993) (reporting results of a survey indicating
that participants believed "[plerusing bank records" to be highly intrusive).
71 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
72 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
73 Id. at 737.
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defendants before aerial surveillance took place. 74 In short, none
of these cases can be analogized to Rehnquist's bar example.
Of course, a number of other cases decided during the
Rehnquist era-specifically, those involving regulatory
inspections, roadblocks, and drug testing programs-did uphold
dragnet-type police operations. Rehnquist could be counted upon
to find for the government in these cases as well, and indeed was
the only Justice to do so in all of them. With respect to regulatory
searches, Rehnquist joined opinions upholding warrantless, non-
particularized inspections of coal mines75 and junkyards, 76 and
joined the dissent in a case holding that warrants are required to
conduct non-consensual Occupational Safety and Health
Administration inspections.77 He wrote or joined opinions
upholding checkpoints designed to nab illegal immigrants,78
unlicensed drivers,79 drunk drivers,80 and (as in his modified bar
example) witnesses to a crime.8' He also joined majority opinions
upholding suspicionless drug testing of railway workers,82 customs
agents,88 and school children.84 Furthermore, in the only three
74 See Florida v. Riley, 448 U.S. 445, 448-49 (1989) (flyover initiated by an
anonymous tip that Riley was growing marijuana in his backyard); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (flyover initiated by an anonymous tip); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986) (flyover occurred after Dow
Chemical refused a second inspection).
75 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment). Rehnquist was careful to note in his concurrence that the inspection of the
coal mine only involved observation of space "largely visible to the naked eye without
entrance onto the company's property." Id. at 609. He abandoned this fastidiousness in
subsequent business-inspection cases. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
76 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987).
7 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-62 (1976).
79 In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), Rehnquist dissented to an opinion
holding that random stops to check licenses violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, he agreed with the Court's dictum that
checkpoints set up for the same purpose are constitutional, albeit with the observation
that the majority's dictum "elevates the adage 'misery loves company' to a novel role in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id.
so Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). Rehnquist wrote the
majority opinion in this case. See id.
81 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 420 (2004).
82 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
8* Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989).
84 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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roadblock and drug-testing cases in which the Court found against
the government, he wrote or joined dissents.85 For instance, in
Chandler v. Miller, where the other eight members of the Court
voted to nullify a Georgia statute that required candidates for
political office to undergo drug testing,86 Rehnquist wrote a
scathing dissenting opinion arguing that the Court's reasoning
would also prohibit a state from requiring candidates to undergo a
general health examination.87
So Rehnquist was a constant, and occasionally the lone, voice
in favor of panvasive searches and seizures. But in each case he
was able to find a "particularized" government rationale. Whether
it was the dangers of coal mining, the use of junkyards to hide car
theft, illegal immigration, drunk driving, or the ravages of drug
usage, Rehnquist could point to a "significant" problem that the
search and seizure program was meant to address.88
In a few of these cases, the government interest Rehnquist
identified was admittedly amorphous. In Chandler, for instance,
he stressed that "the use of illegal drugs and abuse of legal drugs
is one of the major problems of our society" without providing any
concrete evidence that Georgia candidates were afflicted by this
problem,89 a point he implicitly recognized by stating at the end of
his opinion that "[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment or in any
other part of the Constitution prevents a State from enacting a
statute whose principal vice is that it may seem misguided or even
silly to the Members of this Court."90 And in City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond,91 he authored a dissent that appeared to permit
roadblocks at the government's whim, as long as they are
administered in a non-discriminatory fashion. 92 He specifically
85 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 91 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
86 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322-23.
8 See id. at 327-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
88 See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) ("No one can
seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest
in eradicating it.").
89 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 328.
91 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
92 Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("These stops effectively serve the State's
legitimate interests; they are executed in a regularized and neutral manner; and they
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objected to the majority's holding that roadblocks set up to achieve
"ordinary law enforcement interests" were unconstitutional in the
absence of individualized suspicion.93
Yet even in Chandler and Edmond, Rehnquist tried to
identify a concrete law-enforcement problem the panvasive
technique could address. In Chandler, he mentioned the
possibility that drug use by politicians could increase the risk of
corruption and the handling of sensitive information. 94 In
Edmond, he emphasized that while the roadblock was designed in
part to interdict drugs, it was also set up to check licenses (as
indicated by the fact that forty-nine drivers who went through the
roadblock were arrested for non-drug offenses).95 Furthermore, as
solicitous as he was of roadblocks in Edmond, he never explicitly
sanctioned them as a method of checking cars for evidence of any
and all crime. Rather, he simply stated that "[e]fforts to enforce
the law on public highways used by millions of motorists are
obviously necessary to our society"96 after referencing United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte97 and Michigan Department of State
Police v. Sitz,98 the Court cases that upheld checkpoints near the
border for illegal immigrants and sobriety checkpoints. Using
what he called "balancing" analysis, Rehnquist concluded that
these specified government interests were sufficient to justify the
intrusion involved, which he viewed as minimal.99
At bottom, none of these cases involved the type of random
information gathering involved in Rehnquist's bar example, which
in 1974 he stated was "not a proper police function."100 What
would he say today if confronted with the panvasive investigative
only minimally intrude upon the privacy of the motorists. They should therefore be
constitutional.").
93 Id. at 55 (criticizing the majority's holding that at least some individualized
suspicion is required for general law enforcement at checkpoints by stating that "the
Court's newfound non-law-enforcement primary purpose test is both unnecessary to
secure Fourth Amendment rights and bound to produce wide-ranging litigation over
the 'purpose' of any given seizure").
94 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 326-27 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
95 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 55.
9 428 U.S. 543, 561-62 (1976).
8 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
9 Id. at 455.
100 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 9.
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methods described at the beginning of this Essay? How would he
react to the specter of cameras recording everyone's public travels,
gargantuan data-mining programs, dragnet tracking, and city-
wide aerial surveillance? At this point, answers to these questions
can only be pure speculation. But it is speculation worth pursuing,
since it exposes how even a very conservative Justice might react
negatively to dragnet surveillance.
First, consider two solutions proffered by others. The first is
to limit such panvasive techniques to investigation of serious
crimes.101 The second is to place no limitations on the use of these
techniques but rather to restrict the information so gathered to
prosecution of serious offenses.102
If he were to remain consistent with his 1974 article,
Rehnquist would be unlikely to choose either route. As noted
earlier, for procedural-justice reasons he would prefer repealing
laws prohibiting lesser transgressions to making them difficult to
enforce.103 Moreover, given his avid support for the Supreme
Court's decision in Whren v. United States,104 which permits valid
101 See Bellin, supra note 29, at 6 ("[A]s judges develop new rules to apply the
Fourth Amendment in the modern era, they incorporate the severity of the crime being
investigated into determinations of constitutional reasonableness."); William J. Stuntz,
O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 842, 875 (2001) ("[T]he worst crimes are the most important ones to solve, the
ones worth paying the largest price in intrusions on citizens' liberty and privacy.");
Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness," 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1662 (1998) ("The main problem with current Supreme Court
doctrine in the Fourth Amendment area is its almost complete failure to engage in any
substantive scrutiny at all .... ).
102 See SIMON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT TO DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY 5 (2011) ("[Tjhe point
of this book is to shift the focus away from questions of whether and how governments
should collect information and onto more problematic and relevant questions
concerning its use."); Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law,
in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 37, 39-45 (Jeffrey Rosen
& Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011) ("Computer surveillance uses widespread collection and
analysis of less intrusive information to yield clues normally observable only through
the collection of more intrusive information. To achieve those benefits, the law will
need to allow relatively widespread collection of data but then give greater emphasis
and attention to their use and disclosure."); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the
Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2183 (2002) ("Instead of limiting what search tactics the
government can use or requiring permission when it uses them, we could limit what
the government does with the information once it has it.").
103 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
104 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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seizures for minor violations even when the police's real agenda is
to gather evidence of more serous criminality, he appeared to view
arrests for infractions that remain on the books as an excellent
crime-control mechanism.105 Presumably, then, he would have
been reluctant to adopt a rule cabining government's ability to use
technology as a means of sniffing these infractions out.
Rehnquist might have been more attracted to an approach
imposing restrictions on use rather than restrictions on
acquisition. However, two aspects of his 1974 article suggest he
would have been reluctant to adopt this scheme as well. First, the
article, as well as his opinions in Davis and Smith, make clear
that he was reluctant to limit law enforcement use of legitimately
acquired information, whatever its nature.106 Second, and most
importantly, his article registered real concern about panvasive
searches-as he put it, actions that smacked of government
"dossier" creation' 07-if they are conducted in the absence of any
justification.
Instead of adopting one of these approaches, Rehnquist more
likely would have engaged in the balancing analysis apparent in
Chandler, Edmond, and his other Fourth Amendment opinions
and consistent with the third principle-proportionality-implicit
in his article. 08 On the individual interest side of the balance, one
familiar with his body of work on the Court would not be
unreasonable in concluding that he would have considered the
degree of intrusion connected with public surveillance and data
mining minimal. Indeed, had he been on the Court in the 2011-
2012 term when it decided United States v. Jones,09 the most
important, recent Fourth Amendment privacy case, he might well
have been a lone dissenter, disagreeing with both the legal fiction
endorsed by the majority-that placement of a GPS device on a
105 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 52 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("Once the constitutional requirements for a particular seizure are
satisfied, the subjective expectations of those responsible for it, be it police officers or
members of a city council, are irrelevant."); see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128, 136 (1978) ("Subjective intent alone ... does not make otherwise lawful conduct
illegal or unconstitutional").
106 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
107 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 10.
1os See Bradley, supra note 14, at 104 (noting Rehnquist would reason that "[e]ach
search must be assessed according to its reasonableness.").
109 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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car violates a property interest-and the expansive notion of
privacy championed by the concurring opinions-that prolonged
tracking is a search.1 0
Yet Jones, like Miller and most other Court cases dealing
with the definition of "search," involved investigation of a single
person.11' If his 1974 article is any guide, when considering the
individual interests associated with panvasive surveillance,
Rehnquist was more willing to ascribe weight to what he called
the "sense of unease" that comes from government information
gathering.112 While he might have drawn a distinction between
the visible police vehicle in his bar scenario and the usually covert
nature of technological surveillance, his distaste for government-
compiled dossiers suggests he would recognize that such a
distinction quickly dissipates once people find out about
government programs capable of monitoring the public activities
of the entire population and of trawling through billions of data
points.113
Given the views expressed in his University of Kansas Law
Review article, then, it seems likely that Rehnquist would have
been bothered by the panvasiveness of modern technological
surveillance and that instead his focus would have been on the
nature of the government interest. The problem for him in the bar
scenario was the complete lack of justification for the police
activity. The usual justification given for modern camera
110 Rehnquist would have had problems with the majority opinion in Jones because
he consistently distinguished cars from homes in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g.,
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (Rehnquist majority opinion emphasizing
that "[wie have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to be treated
identically with houses or Apartments for Fourth Amendment purposes"); see also
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 55. He would have trouble with the concurring opinions because
he would have been reluctant to reverse the Court's cases holding that one does not
have privacy in public. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000)
(Rehnquist majority opinion distinguishing manipulation of luggage from flyover cases
by noting that the latter "involved only visual, as opposed to tactile, observation").
III After developing reason to believe Jones was a drug trafficker, police tracked
Jones via a GPS device planted on his car for almost a month. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
113 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 334-36 (2008) (reporting results of a survey
indicating that people view many types of camera surveillance and record gathering to
be more intrusive than a roadblock and, in some circumstances, more intrusive than a
frisk).
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surveillance or data mining is that it allows government to detect
otherwise hard-to-detect crime or maintain order through
deterrence. 114 Admittedly, these justifications are not completely
irrational. But unless confined to prevent something of
"extraordinary gravity and seriousness,"11 5 as in the presidential-
rally example he proffered in his University of Kansas Law Review
article, they are even weaker and less specific than the rationales
Rehnquist was willing to accept in Chandler and Edmond.
Perhaps they nonetheless would have struck him as adequate, at
least as a matter of Fourth Amendment law. Perhaps, however, he
would finally have drawn a line, remembering the qualms he
expressed back in 1974.116
CONCLUSION
My own preference with respect to regulation of panvasive
investigative techniques combines political-process theory with a
more robust version of Rehnquist's proportionality reasoning.117 If
the panvasive technique is authorized, directly or through
appropriate delegation, by a legislative body that is truly
representative of the targeted polity, and if it applies evenly to all
(including the officials who authorize the technique), it should be
upheld unless it fails to meet the traditional rational basis test. If
no such legislative authorization exists (which describes almost
every dragnet case considered by the Court during the Rehnquist
era),"18 then seizures or searches conducted during such programs
should be based on suspicion proportionate to the degree of
intrusion.
114 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 67, at 84-88 (cameras); id. at 169-70 (records access).
115 Rehnquist, supra note 12, at 13.
116 Possibly relevant here is the statement Rehnquist made in Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594, 608 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment), that: "I have no
doubt that had Congress enacted a criminal statute similar to that involved here-
authorizing, for example, unannounced warrantless searches of property reasonably
thought to house unlawful drug activity-the warrantless search would be struck down
under our existing Fourth Amendment line of decisions." Would proportionality
reasoning have led him also to strike down suspicionless surveillance of people and
records found outside one's property?
"7 See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107 (2010).
118 Id. at 136.
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Rehnquist clearly would not have required a legislative
enactment in these situations. But he did appear to prefer that
authorization for dragnets come from a supervisory executive
official and be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion. 19 And
while he likely would have found most such legislative or
executive authorizations of panvasive actions rational, the burden
of this Essay has been to show that even he would have required
some specifiable reason for such actions, roughly proportionate to
their intrusiveness. If the Justice often considered the least
friendly to the Fourth Amendment had reservations about
unregulated panvasive methods, the current Court should as
well.120
n9 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1990) (Rehnquist
majority opinion noting that the sobriety checkpoint location was selected by the
director of the state police "pursuant to . . . guidelines" and that the guidelines
governing the police minimize police discretion).
120 Cf. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I rather doubt that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered 'reasonable' a program of
indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing.").
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